Compliance References & Gap Analysis¶
IndustrialScanner is a research and educational tool for passive ICS protocol analysis. It is not compliance-certified and does not replace a formal audit. This page maps where its capabilities align with common OT security standards — and, just as importantly, where the gaps are — so that anyone evaluating the tool knows exactly what it does and does not provide.
Positioning summary¶
| Standard | Relationship | What the tool provides |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK for ICS | Direct mapping | Suspect protocol functions are enriched with ATT&CK for ICS techniques. The catalog is validated against the official STIX bundle in CI (tests/test_mitre_attack_ground_truth.py). |
| NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 | Partial support (detection aid) | Passive PCAP analysis of Modbus/TCP, S7Comm and DNP3 can feed the network-monitoring evidence expected for OT security programs. It is a point tool, not a monitoring platform. |
| IEC 62443 | Assessment aid only | The zones/conduits guide provides a practical register and evidence workflow informed by 62443-3-2 and 2-1. The tool implements no 62443 requirements and performs no certification testing. |
| NERC CIP | Reference only | Report outputs (JSON/HTML, per-PCAP evidence) can contribute to an audit evidence portfolio (e.g. CIP-010 configuration monitoring), but the tool itself satisfies no CIP requirement. |
| ISO/IEC 27019 | Reference only | Same as above: outputs may inform energy-utility security reviews; the tool makes no certification claim. |
Known gaps¶
Honest limitations of the current implementation:
- Passive scope only for S7Comm/DNP3. The Modbus scanner is active but
strictly read-only (function codes
0x01–0x04). There are no write or control primitives for any protocol. - No continuous monitoring. Analysis is batch-oriented (per PCAP file); there is no live capture, streaming detection, or alerting pipeline.
- No asset inventory or profiling. The tool classifies protocol functions, not devices; it does not build a passive asset baseline.
- Protocol coverage is deliberately narrow. S7Comm (classic), Modbus/TCP
and DNP3 only. No S7Comm-Plus (
0x72), PROFINET, EtherNet/IP or IEC 61850. - No TCP reassembly. Frames split across TCP segments (or several TPKT PDUs coalesced into one segment) are not reassembled; analysis is per-segment. S7 PDUs larger than one MSS (e.g. S7-1500, PDU 1920) may be under-counted.
- Userdata sub-function coverage is partial. Password, ReadSZL and Flash
LED commands are decoded; other programming commands (variable-table
transfers, block info, mode transitions) are reported with the generic
Userdatalabel. - Target safety policy covers the CLI entry point. The service layer and CLI filter public targets; scripts that import the Modbus scanner directly bypass that filter and are the operator's responsibility.
- Reports are evidence, not attestations. Generated JSON/HTML reports document what was observed in the analyzed captures and carry no compliance status.
Using the tool in an audit context¶
The intended role is narrow and concrete: produce repeatable, structured evidence of which ICS protocol operations appear in a capture, with MITRE ATT&CK for ICS attribution for suspect functions. Feed those outputs into your audit workflow; do not treat running the tool as fulfilling any control by itself.