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Compliance References & Gap Analysis

IndustrialScanner is a research and educational tool for passive ICS protocol analysis. It is not compliance-certified and does not replace a formal audit. This page maps where its capabilities align with common OT security standards — and, just as importantly, where the gaps are — so that anyone evaluating the tool knows exactly what it does and does not provide.

Positioning summary

Standard Relationship What the tool provides
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Direct mapping Suspect protocol functions are enriched with ATT&CK for ICS techniques. The catalog is validated against the official STIX bundle in CI (tests/test_mitre_attack_ground_truth.py).
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 Partial support (detection aid) Passive PCAP analysis of Modbus/TCP, S7Comm and DNP3 can feed the network-monitoring evidence expected for OT security programs. It is a point tool, not a monitoring platform.
IEC 62443 Assessment aid only The zones/conduits guide provides a practical register and evidence workflow informed by 62443-3-2 and 2-1. The tool implements no 62443 requirements and performs no certification testing.
NERC CIP Reference only Report outputs (JSON/HTML, per-PCAP evidence) can contribute to an audit evidence portfolio (e.g. CIP-010 configuration monitoring), but the tool itself satisfies no CIP requirement.
ISO/IEC 27019 Reference only Same as above: outputs may inform energy-utility security reviews; the tool makes no certification claim.

Known gaps

Honest limitations of the current implementation:

  • Passive scope only for S7Comm/DNP3. The Modbus scanner is active but strictly read-only (function codes 0x01–0x04). There are no write or control primitives for any protocol.
  • No continuous monitoring. Analysis is batch-oriented (per PCAP file); there is no live capture, streaming detection, or alerting pipeline.
  • No asset inventory or profiling. The tool classifies protocol functions, not devices; it does not build a passive asset baseline.
  • Protocol coverage is deliberately narrow. S7Comm (classic), Modbus/TCP and DNP3 only. No S7Comm-Plus (0x72), PROFINET, EtherNet/IP or IEC 61850.
  • No TCP reassembly. Frames split across TCP segments (or several TPKT PDUs coalesced into one segment) are not reassembled; analysis is per-segment. S7 PDUs larger than one MSS (e.g. S7-1500, PDU 1920) may be under-counted.
  • Userdata sub-function coverage is partial. Password, ReadSZL and Flash LED commands are decoded; other programming commands (variable-table transfers, block info, mode transitions) are reported with the generic Userdata label.
  • Target safety policy covers the CLI entry point. The service layer and CLI filter public targets; scripts that import the Modbus scanner directly bypass that filter and are the operator's responsibility.
  • Reports are evidence, not attestations. Generated JSON/HTML reports document what was observed in the analyzed captures and carry no compliance status.

Using the tool in an audit context

The intended role is narrow and concrete: produce repeatable, structured evidence of which ICS protocol operations appear in a capture, with MITRE ATT&CK for ICS attribution for suspect functions. Feed those outputs into your audit workflow; do not treat running the tool as fulfilling any control by itself.