Modbus/TCP¶
Modbus/TCP is the most widely deployed industrial protocol, running over TCP/502. It is a simple request-response protocol originally designed by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 for serial communication, later adapted for TCP.
What IndustrialScanner does¶
The Modbus scanner issues only read function codes:
| Code | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x01 | Read Coils | Read discrete outputs (ON/OFF) |
| 0x02 | Read Discrete Inputs | Read discrete inputs (read-only) |
| 0x03 | Read Holding Registers | Read 16-bit registers |
| 0x04 | Read Input Registers | Read 16-bit input registers (read-only) |
No write or control operations are intentionally issued. Read-only does not guarantee zero operational impact: validate the scanner in a representative lab, obtain asset-owner authorization, and use a maintenance window before active scanning of production PLCs.
Usage¶
industrial-scanner modbus --targets 192.168.1.10 --unit 1
industrial-scanner modbus --targets 192.168.1.0/24 --port 502 --unit 1
industrial-scanner modbus --targets @targets.txt --timeout 2.5
Output¶
Each scan produces:
- JSON report in
reports/modbus_batch/modbus_scan_<timestamp>.json - HTML report in
reports/modbus_batch/modbus_scan_<timestamp>.html
The report includes:
- Per-host: reachable, latency_ms, reads (4 windows), exposure flags, errors
- Summary: total reachable, unauthenticated_read count, broad_register_access count
Exposure signals¶
The scanner reports two exposure signals per host:
- unauthenticated_read: True if any read function returned data without authentication. Modbus/TCP has no built-in authentication, so this is almost always True for any reachable PLC.
- broad_register_access: True if 2 or more read windows returned data. This indicates the PLC exposes multiple data types without restriction.
Security considerations¶
- Modbus/TCP has no authentication, no encryption, no integrity by design
- Anyone with network access to TCP/502 can read AND write to the PLC
- The scanner is read-only, but a malicious actor on the same network is not
- Active reads can still consume device or network resources; execution is single-flight by default and supports a delay between targets
- For production deployments, consider Modbus/TCP Security (RFC 9441) which adds TLS + X.509 + per-function-code access control
MITRE ATT&CK mapping¶
Read operations map to: - T0801 — Monitor Process State - T0802 — Automated Discovery
(Write/control operations — if detected in passive PCAPs — map to T0858 Change Operating Mode. The scanner does not issue these.)